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LEGAL MALPRACTICE-COLLECTIBILITY OF DAMAGES-BURDEN OF PROVING
(UN)COLLECTIBILITY OF DAMAGES-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that collectibility of damages in the underlying suit was
properly considered in a legal malpractice cause of action and that
the burden of proving (un)collectibility of damages was on the
attorney-defendant, who must plead uncollectibility as an
affirmative defense and prove it by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Kituskie v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027 (Pa 1998).
On September 3, 1989, Leo Kituskie, a Pennsylvania resident and
practicing periodontist, was injured in a two-car accident during a
vacation in San Jose, California.' The accident report noted that
Evan Trapp, who was driving while intoxicated and at a high rate
of speed, crossed a highway on-ramp and hit Kituskie's vehicle. 2 On
September 9, 1989, after his return to Philadelphia to begin
treatment for his injuries, Kituskie retained Scott K Corbman to
pursue his claim against Trapp for the personal injuries he
sustained in the accident.3 Corbman was licensed to practice law in
Pennsylvania and was a principal/shareholder in the law firm of
Garfinkle, Corbman, Greenberg and Jurikson, P.C. (hereinafter the
Garfinkle firm).
4
Corbman obtained Kituskie's medical reports, then made a claim
on Kituskie's behalf against the California State Automobile
Association ("CSAA7), Trapp's insurance carrier.5 While negotiating
with CSAA, Corbman learned that Trapp's insurance policy limit
was $25,000.6 Not until September 17, 1990, more than one year
after the accident, did Corbman discover that California's statute of
limitations for Kitsukie's injuries was one year as opposed to
1. Kituslde v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027, 1028 (Pa. 1998). As a result of the accident,
Kituskie suffers from a degenerative, arthritic back condition, making full-time work difficult.
Id.
2. Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1028.
3. Id.
4. Id. "The Garfinkel firm is a Pennsylvania professional corporation engaged in the
practice of law with its principal place of business located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania." Id.
at 1028 n.1.
5. Id. at 1029.
6. Id..
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Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations. 7 CSAA informed
Corbman that it would not make a settlement offer to Kituskie
because Corbman had not instituted a formal legal action or settled
within the one-year statute of limitations.8 Corbman related this
information to Kituskie and advised him that he should obtain
other counsel and institute a claim against him for legal
malpractice.9
On August 28, 1991, Kituskie brought suit against Corbman and
the Garfinkle law firm in the Montgomery County Court of
Common Pleas, alleging legal malpractice. 10 This court determined
that the collectibility of damages in an underlying case is not
relevant to a legal malpractice claim in Pennsylvania and granted
each party's motion in limine" requesting that the other side be
precluded from presenting expert testimony on the possibility that
CSAA would have settled the matter within the policy limits of
Trapp's policy.12 The trial lasted six days, and on January 11, 1995,
a jury found Corbman and the Garfinkle firm liable for legal
malpractice in the amount of $2,300,000.13
Upon appeal, the superior court "vacated the judgment and
remanded for further proceedings because it held that the
collectibility of damages in an underlying case should be
considered in a legal malpractice action."' 4 The superior court also
held that the attorney sued for legal malpractice bears the burden
of proving as a defense (in the form of mitigation of damages) that
7. Kituskie, 714 k2d at 1029. See the Pennsylvania Uniform Statute of Limitations on
Foreign Claims Act ("borrowing statute"), which applies either the period of limitation
provided or prescribed by the law of the place where the claim accrued or the law of the
commonwealth, whichever first bars the claim. 42 Pp CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521 (1981)
(applying California's statute of limitation to preclude recovery in a cause of action filed in
Pennsylvania).
8. Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1029.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. A "motion in limine" is defined as a "pretrial motion requesting court to prohibit
opposing counsel from referring to or offering evidence on matters so highly prejudicial to
moving party that curative instructions cannot prevent predispositional effect on jury."
BLACK'S LAW DicToNARY 1013 (6th ed. 1990).
12. Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1029. Kituskie sought to preclude the testimony of Corbman
and the Garfinkle firm's expert about what CSAA would have done if Corbman had instituted
a timely lawsuit on Kituskie's behalf. Id. at n.3. Corbman and the Garfinkle firm sought to
preclude testimony by Kituskie's expert that CSAA might not have settled for the policy
limits and that Kituskie would have recovered a full judgment due to CSAAs bad faith
refusal to settle. Id. at n.3.




the underlying case would have been uncollectible. 15 On April 28,
1997, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur 16 to
decide two issues: (1) whether collectibility should be part of a
legal malpractice action; and, if so, (2) which party bears the
burden of proof as to collectibility.
17
The supreme court noted that in a legal malpractice case, the
plaintiff must prove not only that he or she has a cause of action
against the party in the underlying case, but also that the attorney
hired had been negligent in prosecuting or defending that
underlying case (often referred to as proving "a case within a
case").18 Specifically, the court stated that a client-plaintiff must
establish three elements in a claim of legal malpractice: (1) an
attorney-client relationship or other basis for a duty; (2) failure on
the part of the attorney to exercise ordinary sldll and knowledge;
and (3) damage to the plaintiff proximately caused by such
negligence.19 In addition, proof of actual loss rather than a breach
of a professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative
harm, or the threat of future harm is required.20 As the issue of
whether collectibility of damages in an underlying case should also
be part of a legal malpractice action was a case of first impression
in Pennsylvania, the court reviewed decisions from California, the
District of Columbia, Michigan, Maine, Massachusetts, New York,
and New Jersey, which had unanimously held that collectibility of
damages should be considered in a legal malpractice action.
2'
As a result, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Castille,
the court held that collectibility of damages in the underlying case
should be considered in legal malpractice actions.22 Furthermore,
15. Id.
16. "Allocatur" is defined as "[ilt is allowed. [It was] formerly used to denote that a
wilt or order was allowed." BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
17. Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1029.
18. Id. at 1030.
19. Id. at 1029-30 (citing Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 65 (Pa. 1989)).
20. Id. at 1030 (citing Rizzo, 555 A.2d at 68).
21. Id. at 1030.
22. Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1030. The court justified its holding on the distinctness of a
legal malpractice action:
A legal malpractice action is different because, . . . a plaintiff must prove a case
within a case since he must initially establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
he would have recovered a judgment in the underlying action . . . It is only after
(that)... that the plaintiff can then proceed with proof that the attorney he engaged
to prosecute or defend the underlying action was negligent in the handling of the
underlying action and that negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss
since it prevented the plaintiff from being properly compensated for his loss.
1999
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the supreme court agreed with the superior court that "it would be
inequitable for the plaintiff to be able to obtain a judgment against
the attorney which is greater than the judgment that the plaintiff
could have collected from the third party."23 As to Kituskie's
contention that the this "new rule" be applied purely prospectively,
the court held that the "new rule" of collectibility in legal
malpractice actions should rather be applied retroactively "so that
it is at issue on remand in the case sub judice."
24
Continuing, the court noted that, although jurisdictions have
unanimously agreed that collectibility should be considered, they
have been split on the additional question of who bears the burden
of proof.25 The majority of courts have placed the burden on the
plaintiff, while a small minority have placed the burden of proving
(un)collectibility on the attorney-defendant. 26 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania adopted the minority position and held that an
attorney-defendant "in a legal malpractice action should plead and
prove the affirmative defense that the underlying case was not
collectible by a preponderance of the evidence."
27
As a result, the Kituskie Court affirmed the superior court's
holding that the collectibility of damages is to be considered in a
legal malpractice cause of action and that the burden of proving
(un)collectibility of damages in the underlying case is borne by the
attorney-defendant. 28 The court remanded the matter to the trial
court for further proceedings.
29
As Chief Justice Abbott proclaimed in an early English case,
23. Id. (citing Kituside v. Corbman, 682 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. 1996)).
24. Id., at 1030 n.5. "Sub judice" means " [u]nder or before a judge or court; under
judicial consideration; [or] undetermined." BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNARY 1425 (6th ed. 1990). The
court explained that the general rule is that a decision announcing a new rule of law is
applied retroactively so that a party whose case is pending on direct appeal is entitled to the
benefit of changes in the law. Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1030 n.5 (citing McHugh v. Litvin,
Blumberg, Matusow & Young, 574 A.2d 1040, 1043 (Pa. 1990)).
25. Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1031.
26. Id. The majority place the burden of proof on the plaintiff because proving
collectibility is viewed as being closely related to the issue of proximate cause, which the
plaintiff needs to prove as part of the prima facie case. Id. The minority reason that the
burden of proof in a legal malpractice action requires only that the plaintiff prove a loss of
judgment on a valid claim and that it would be unjust to add the additional burden of
proving collectibility of damages. Id.
27. Id. at 1032. Furthermore, the court explained that "uncollectibility should be pled
as New Matter pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1030. ... Uncollectibility is a technical defense
which could require extensive preparation by all parties. Therefore, the defendant should put
the plaintiff on notice of the defense by raising it as New Matter." Id. at n.8.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1033.
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"God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney, or a
counsel, or even a judge is bound to know all the law .... "-30 The
English common law began to hold attorneys and other
professionals claiming competency in certain fields liable for
negligence as early as the eighteenth century.31 As to the plaintiff's
recovery, in 1841, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that if a
client could not have recovered in the underlying action, the
plaintiff in the malpractice action should recover nominal damages
only.32 The United States Supreme Court set forth the "American
Theory" in 1880.3
An attorney's liability to a client could be founded on several
different theories; however, the underlying basis for legal
malpractice is most often negligence resulting from an implied
contract.34 An attorney is usually held to have agreed to undertake
the representation at issue with an implied term of ordinary skill
and knowledge. 35 Whatever theory of liability is claimed, the
prerequisites remain the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty,
and proximate causation of damage.
36
In 1979, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania noted that, although
the issue of damage assessment in cases of professional negligence
had not yet been considered by the appellate courts of
Pennsylvania, other jurisdictions had established three essential
elements of such a case: "(1) the employment of the attorney or
other basis for duty; (2) the failure of the attorney to exercise
ordinary skill and knowledge; and (3) that such negligence was the
proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff."37 In 1989, the Supreme
30. DUKE NORDLINGER STERN, AN ATrORNEY'S GUIDE TO MALPRACTICE LiABLITY 4 (1977)
(citing John W, Wade, The Attorney's Liability For Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1959))
(quoting Montriou v. Jefferys, 172 Eng. Rep. 51, 53 (NP. 1825)).
31. STERN, supra note 30, at 7 (citing Dennis L Gillen, Legal Malpractice, 12 WASHBURN
LJ. 281 (1973)) (citing Wade, supra note 30).
32. Cox v. Livingston, 2 Watts and Serg. 103, 107 (Pa. 1841).
33. STERN, supra note 30, at 9 (citing Gillen, supra note 31) (citing National Sav. Bank
v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199-200 (1880)). The Supreme Court declared:
Unless the client is injured by the deficiencies of his attorney, he cannot maintain
any action for damages; but if he is injured, the true rule is that the attorney is liable
for the want of such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession
commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment.
National Sav. Bank, 100 U.S. at 199-200.
34. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.1, at 555 (4th ed.
1996).
35. Id.
36. Id. See id., § 8.2(duty), § 8.4 (causation), and Chapter 19 (damages).
37. Schenkel v. Monheit, 405 A.2d 493, 494 (Pa. Super. 1979) (quoting R. MALLEN & V.
LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 123 (1977)). In Schenkel, a client sued his attorney for failing to join
1999
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Court of Pennsylvania acknowledged these necessary elements to a
legal malpractice action in Rizzo v. Haines.38
In Duke & Co. v. Anderson, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
was confronted with the issue of whether a client suing his
attorney and his law firm in assumpsit for the alleged failure to file
a defamation action needed to show some injury before he could
recover damages. 39 The court ruled that when such a suit is filed,
an essential element of the case, whether it is filed in assumpsit or
trespass, is proof of actual 1oss.40 In Duke & Co., when retirees
filed a complaint against the Duquesne Brewing Company (later
known as Duke and Company), its pension plan and pension board,
and two corporate officers for death benefits that the company was
terminating, claiming that these defendants had been unjustly
enriched by their actions, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette published an
article reporting the lawsuit.41 The two officers met with corporate
counsel, Anderson, and told him to file a defamation suit.42 One
year later, by the time one of the officers learned that the suit had
never been filed, the defamation action was barred by the statute
of limitations.4
Duke & Co. filed an action in assumpsit against Anderson and
his firm; Anderson made a motion for nonsuit, which was granted."
Duke & Co. argued that because its claim was filed in assumpsit,
not trespass, a jury should hear the evidence because it was
possible that the jury might award at least nominal damages for
breach of contract.45 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania refused to
base a decision on such distinctions and ruled that proof of actual
the tortfeasor's employer as a party to the underlying action. Id. Because the client, through
his new counsel, had not properly challenged the adequacy of the jury's verdict and the
tortfeasor's insurer had paid the full verdict amount, the court held that the client had failed
to establish that he had been damaged by the attorney's alleged negligence, recognizing that
"proof of damages is as crucial to a professional negligence action for legal malpractice as is
proof of the negligence itself." Id. at 494-95.
38. Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 65 (Pa. 1989). In Rizzo, the client was injured in a car
accident, and the attorney instituted two lawsuits on his behalf. Id. at 60. The attorney
neither investigated all settlement offers nor communicated all such offers to his client. Id.
at 66. The court adopted the Schenkel factors and noted that the duty of an attorney to use
ordinary skill and knowledge extends to conduct during settlement negotiations. Id. at 65.
39. Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 418 A.2d. 613, 614-15 (Pa. Super. 1980).
40. Duke & Co., 418 A.2d. at 617.
41. Id. at 614.
42. Id. Two months later the company terminated its relationship with Anderson. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Duke & Co.. 418 A.2d at 615.
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loss is required regardless of the form of action.46 Although the
Duke & Co. decision was contrary to precedent, the court declared
that "the law changes."47 As a result, in the commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, a client-plaintiff must not only demonstrate the three
basic elements set forth in Schenkel and Rizzo to establish a claim
of legal malpractice, but he or she must also prove actual loss.4
Closely related to the issue of actual loss is the issue of
collectibility, which the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee examined in Sitton v. Clements.49 Fuller, a
union business agent, had shot the plaintiff, resulting in the
plaintiffs permanent paralysis from the waist down.50 The plaintiff
hired the attorney-defendant, Clements, to represent him in
assisting the state in prosecuting Fuller and to file a civil suit
against Fuller.51 Although the plaintiff and the attorney-defendant
had signed a written contract agreeing that a civil action would be
instituted, the civil action was not filed within the one-year statute
of limitations period.52 After the jury had been advised that the
burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that he was entitled
to damages from Fuller and to show that Fuller was solvent, it
46. Id. at 616-17. The court noted that if it held otherwise, a client who could not
prove actual loss would nevertheless be able to maintain an action in assumpsit for nominal
damages. Id. at 616. The court recognized that this could lead to disappointed clients being
encouraged to resort to "oppressive" litigation and to attorneys filing actions that would
otherwise be frivolous, in violation of the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
47. Id. at 617. The court noted that the other cases were decided before the law of
malpracticed had developed to the point it had reached in 1980. Id.
48. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: "The mere breach of a professional
duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm-not yet
realized-does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence...." Rizzo, 555 A.2d at
68 (quoting Schenkel v. Monheit, 405 A.2d 493, 494 (Pa. Super. 1979)) (quoting Budd v.
Nixen, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal.1971)).
The court continued:
The test of whether damages are remote or speculative has nothing to do with the
difficulty in calculating the amount, but deals with the more basic question of whether
there are identifiable damages . . . Thus, damages are speculative only if the
uncertainty concerns the fact of damages rather than the amount.
Rizzo, 555 A.2d at 68 (quoting Pashak v. Barish, 450 A.2d 67, 69 (Pa. Super. 1982)) (quoting
R MALLEN & V. LEvrrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 302, at 353-54 (2d ed. 1981)).
49. Sitton v. Clements, 257 F Supp. 63 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), affd, 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.
1967).
50. Sitton, 257 F Supp. at 64.
51. Id. at 65.
52. Id. The attorney-defendant testified that he advised the plaintiff that if a civil suit
was filed while the criminal case was pending, it might damage the possibility of a
conviction. Id. He testified that the plaintiff was more anxious to obtain a criminal
conviction and decided against the institution of a civil suit. Id.
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returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $162,500.5
The district court rejected the attorney-defendant's contentions
that the award was so large that it should be set aside as
"shock(ing) the conscience of the court;" however, the court did
grant a remittitur of $8 1,2 50 .5 Although the court observed that
under Tennessee law, a judgment is good for ten years and may be
renewed, it found that it was not reasonably clear that all of the
$162,500 could have been collected from Fuller because the
plaintiff did not prove the collectibility of the underlying
judgment.5
In McDow v. Dixon, the Court of Appeals of Georgia considered
whether an attorney was negligent for failing to file an action for
damages on the plaintiff's behalf.5 The court observed that in a
legal malpractice action, a client must prove not only that the claim
was valid and would have resulted in a judgment, but also that
some portion of the judgment would have been collectible.57 The
plaintiff claimed to have lost a personal injury claim against the
Decatur School of Ballet because the attorney-defendant failed to
file suit within the statute of limitations, but he offered no direct
evidence of the school's solvency.5 This court noted that, although
a litigant's solvency was normally considered to be too prejudicial
to jurors and to have no probative value as to the claim, in legal
malpractice claims, "the possession of some assets by the original
alleged tortfeasor is essential to the plaintiff's ability to collect a
judgment."5 As the record did show that an offer had been made
to settle for $2,500, the court affirmed the trial court's decision for
the plaintiff on the condition that damages be reduced to $2,500. 60
In DiPalma v. Seldman, the California District Court of Appeal
considered whether a nonsuit was improper with respect to alleged
malpractice if a client presented substantial evidence that the
53. Id.
54. Id. at 66-67. "Remittitur" is defined as "the procedural process by which an
excessive verdict of the jury is reduced." BLACK'S LAw DIcToNARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990).
55. Sitton, 257 F.Supp. at 66. The court noted that Fuller could not have satisfied the
$162,500 judgment either before or imunediately after serving a jail sentence for the same
assault Id.
56. McDow v. Dixon, 226 S.E.2d 145, 146 (Ga. App. 1976).
57. McDow, 226 S.E.2d at 147.
58. Id. at 148.
59. Id. The court distinguished solvency in this context from the bankruptcy standard.
Id. at 147. Here, the term is used to illustrate the underlying defendant's ability to pay a
judgment. Id.
60. Id. at 148.
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underlying judgment was collectible. 61 The court found that a client
suing his or her attorney for malpractice must also prove that
careful management of the lawsuit would have resulted in a
favorable judgment and collection thereof.62 DiPalma had invested
money with the Blooms for real estate development in Florida and
retained Seldman when he became concerned over certain papers
Mr. Bloom gave him to sign.6 Seldman negligently advised DiPalma
to sign a quitclaim deed, thereby transferring any rights and
interests he had in certain property to the Blooms before DiPalma
had obtained payment of $240,000 from the Blooms.64 Although
Seldman had the settlement entered as a stipulated judgment in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California, it
was nearly eleven months before he forwarded the judgment to a
Florida attorney to commence collection work.6 The trial court
granted Seldman's motion for nonsuit because the Blooms had filed
for bankruptcy and there was no evidence the judgment against the
Blooms could have been collected.6
As to Seldman's negligent advice to file a quitclaim deed, the
California Court of Appeal acknowledged that collectibility was
irrelevant; however, collectibility was an element of the case to the
extent that the alleged malpractice consisted of Seldman's failure to
enforce the stipulated judgment.67 As DiPalma had presented
substantial evidence that the underlying judgment was collectible,
the court concluded that the nonsuit was improper and the suit
should have gone to the jury s
In Klump v. Duffus, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the district court had abused its
discretion by precluding introduction of evidence concerning the
underlying defendant's financial ability to pay the judgment against
him.6 When Loretta Klump's attorney did not file an action on her
behalf within the applicable statute of limitations period, she sued
him for legal malpractice. 70 Prior to trial, the district court granted
61. DiPalma v. Seldman, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 222 (Cal. App. 1994).
62. DiPa/ma, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222-23 (citing Campbell v. Magana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
63. Id. at 221.
64. Id.
65. Id. Seldman was licensed to practice in California only. Id.
66. Id. at 221-22.
67. DiPalma, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224.
68. Id. at 225.
69. KIump v. Duffus, 71 F.3d 1368, 1375 (7th Cir. 1995).
70. Klump, 71 F3d at 1370. Loretta Klump was injured by Curt Eaves in an automobile
1999
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Kump's motion in limine7l to preclude any evidence regarding
Eaves' ability to pay.72 Although the attorney-defendant did not
dispute the jury's determination that $424,000 was the judgment
that KIlump would have been awarded against Eaves, he did
successfully argue that the district court erred in precluding the
introduction of evidence regarding Eaves' ability to pay that
judgment.73 The court of appeals not only reversed the district
court's finding, but it also concluded that the plaintiff should bear
the burden of proving the amount she would have actually
collected from the underlying defendant as an element of her
malpractice claim.74 This practice, the court held, would be more
consistent with a plaintiff's burden of proof in negligence actions
generally.75 The case was remanded for a new trial in which
evidence as to the underlying defendant's employment status,
financial position, asset ownership, insurance coverage, and other
relevant information would be presented to determine the amount
the plaintiff would have actually collected from the underlying
defendant had the attorney filed the lawsuit within the statute of
limitations.76
Many other jurisdictions have similarly treated the issue of
collectibility as part of the plaintiffs prima facie case.77 As
collectibility relates to both causation and damages, courts
understandably find this to be a necessary element of the plaintiffs
accident. Id.
71. See supra notell.
72. Klump, 71 F3d at 1370. Eaves was unemployed, had no assets, and had only a
$25,000 insurance policy with respect to the accident. Id.
73. Id. at 1373-74. The district court stated that Klump was entitled to the full amount
of the judgment if she could prove that any portion of the underlying hypothetical judgment
would have been collectible. Id. at 1374.
74. Id. at 1374.
75. Id. See Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages in a Thial Within a Trial -
A Critical Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability, 73 MARQ. L REV. 40,
52 (1989) ("To predicate an award of damages upon both the requirement that a judgment
would have been recovered and that it would have been collectible . . . requires a showing
of causation . . . that is conceptually no different from that required in negligence cases
generally.")
76. Klump, 71 F3d at 1375.
77. See Lawson v. Sigfrid, 262 P1018 (Colo. 1927); Palmieri v. W'mnick, 482 A-2d 1229
(Conn. Super. 1984); Sheppard v. Krol, 578 N.E.2d 212 (11l. App. 1991); Whiteaker v. State, 382
N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 1986); Jernigan v. Giard, 500 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1986); Christy v.
Saliterman, 179 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1970); Eno v. Watkins, 429 N.W.2d 371 (Neb. 1988); Larson
v. Crucet, 481 N.YS.2d 368 (N.Y App. Div. 1984); Rorrer v. Cooke, 329 S.E.2d 355 (N.C. 1985);
Hammons v. Schrunk, 305 P.2d 405 (Or. 1956); Taylor Oil Co. v. Weisensee, 334 N.W.2d 27




case in a legal malpractice action.78
Other courts have agreed that collectibility is relevant, but have
held conversely that collectibility must be demonstrated by the
attorney-defendant. According to at least one scholar, this has the
effect of shifting the issue of collectibility to an affirmative defense
and properly relieving the plaintiff of an extra burden that was not
necessarily part of the original claim. 79
In Hoppe v. Ranzini, the New Jersey Superior Court considered
whether proof of (un)collectibility of the judgment against the
underlying defendant was a proper consideration for a jury in a
legal, malpractice suit.8° The defendant attorneys were sued for
malpractice when they failed to file a claim against the underlying
defendant within the statute of limitations period.
8'
In advance of trial, the judge ruled that judgment should not be
limited to the maximum amount (then $10,000) set forth in a New
Jersey statute governing the state's unsatisfied claims and
judgments.8 2 The defendants contended that DePoe's solvency at
the time of the accident or the malpractice action must be
considered; otherwise, the plaintiff would be in a better position
than he would have been if he had succeeded in the underlying
claim against DePoe. 3 As New Jersey's appellate courts had not
previously considered what damages could be recovered in such a
legal malpractice action, the court noted that in adopting a new
rule, it should be careful to balance the rights of, and burdens on,
both clients and attorneys.84 The court concluded that a trial in
such a case should be bifurcatedu and that the burden of proof
with respect to (un)collectibility should be the defendants',
6
78. John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the Crumbling
Dike and the Threatening Flood, 61 TEmP. L REV. 1127, 1135 (1988).
79. Id. at 1137.
80. Hoppe v. Ranzini, 385 A.2d 913, 916-17 (N.J. Super. 1978). The plaintiff had been
injured in a car accident by DePoe, who was uninsured, had no assets, had an income of $45
a week at most, and had been in and out of jail. Id. at 915.
81. Hoppe, 385 A.2d. at 915.
82. Id. The judge reasoned that the judgment would be viable for twenty years, during
which time DePoe might be able to pay the amount that the jury might award and that to
ask the jury to determine DePoe's future earning power or accession to assets would require
it to speculate. Id. at 915-16.
83. Id. at 916.
84. Id. at 918. The court noted that the fiduciary relationship between an attorney and
client and the practice of law's effect on the public welfare should also be considered. Id.
85. A "bifurcated trial" is defined as a "[t]rial of issues separately[.]" BLACK'S LAW
DicnoNARY 163 (6th ed. 1990).
86. Hoppe, 385 A.2d at 919-920. The court explained that the first trial should include
questions of malpractice and the amount of judgment that would have been recoverable
1999
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In Jourdain v. Dineen, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
determined that the (un)collectibility of an underlying cause of
action in a malpractice suit was an affirmative defense that must
be pleaded and proved by the defendant.87 The Jourdains had been
injured in an automobile accident and retained Dineen to represent
them in a personal injury suit against the other driver.88 Not only
did Dineen fail to file the personal injury action within the six-year
statute of limitations period, but he also failed to tell the Jourdains
about the true status of their claim for more than twenty-two
months after the statute had run.89 After a jury trial, which resulted
in a $35,000 award to the Jourdains on the malpractice claim,
Dineen appealed on the grounds that the Jourdains' claim against
him must fail because evidence at the trial did not establish that
they would have collected a judgment against the underlying
defendant.90 The court rejected this argument and concluded that
"because uncollectibility of a judgment should be treated as a
matter constituting an avoidance or mitigation of the consequences
of one's negligent act, it must be pleaded and proved by the
defendant."91
In Teodorescu v. BushneU, Gage, Reizen, & Byington, a divorce
client sued her attorney for malpractice and was awarded damages
by a jury.92 The attorney-defendant appealed on the grounds that
the plaintiff did not satisfy her proximate causation burden because
she did not prove the collectibility of the underlying judgment.93
The Michigan Court of Appeals announced that it would follow the
against DePoe had suit been timely filed. Id. at 919. DePoe's income, solvency, or insurance
coverage would not be admissible in that trial. Id. If the jury awarded a money verdict, then
the attorney-defendants could move for a second trial as to the (un)collectibility of that
judgment and introduce evidence of income, solvency, and insurance coverage. Id. at
919-920.
87. Jourdain v. Dineen, 527 A.2d 1304, 1306 (Me. 1987).
88. Jourdain, 527 A.2d at 1305.
89. Id.
90. Id..at 1306.
91. Id. The court adopted this rule despite its recognition that many jurisdictions have
placed the burden of proof of collectibility on the plaintiff. Id.
92. Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen, & Byington, 506 N.W.2d 275, 276 (Mich. App.
1993). The plaintiff had been awarded.the marital home, free and clear of the mortgage,
during her divorce hearings. Id. When she received notice that her husband had stopped
making mortgage payments and informed attorney-defendant, she was told the firm would
handle the matter. Id. The mortgagee foreclosed, and the firm did not take any action
regarding the proceeding. Id. at 276-77.
93. Teodorescu, 506 N.W.2d at 278. The attorney-defendant argued that if the underlying
defendant (the husband) could not have satisfied a greater judgment, then the wife was left
in the same position she would have been if there had been no legal malpractice. Id.
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minority view and hold (un)collectibility to be an affirmative
defense to a legal malpractice action that must be pleaded and
proved by the defendant.
4
In Smith v. Haden, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia first addressed the issue of collectibility.9 5 The
Smith Court held-that the burden was on the attorney-defendant to
prove (un)collectibility in a legal malpractice action'. 96 Although the
court acknovledged that a plaintiff in a legal malpractice claim
must prove a "case within a case,"97 it noted that it did not
necessarily follow that the plaintiff must prove the collectibility of
the judgment, as "normally, enforcement of the judgment remains
for another day."
98
The court listed four reasons why burdening the plaintiff with
proving the degree of collectibility of the underlying judgment is
unfair: (1) the attorney-defendant's failure to act in a timely manner
has resulted in the plaintiff's delay in filing the underlying suit; 99(2)
the underlying suit might have been settled, if it had been actively
litigated;1°° (3) the passage of time can significantly affect the
collectibility of a judgment;'0 ' and (4) a judgment on the merits of
the plaintiff's case is itself "vindication of the legitimacy of the
claim, and has value regardless of whether it is wholly
collectible."102
Therefore, although courts in other jurisdictions have agreed
upon the importance of considering the collectibility of the
underlying judgment, they differ as to who bears the burden of
proving (un)collectibility. Consistent with the trend of other
jurisdictions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kituskie correctly
held that (un)collectibility of damages in the underlying action of a
legal malpractice suit should be considered. However, the court
94. Id.
95. Smith v. Haden, 868 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1994), affd, 69 F3d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
The plaintiff claimed that she had employed the attorney-defendant to file a civil action and
that the attorney had breached his duty because the statute of limitations had expired before
any action was filed. Id. at 1.
96. Smith, 868 F.Supp. at 3.
97. Id. at 2. The court explains this to mean that a plaintiff must show that she had a










joined the minority of jurisdictions when it affirmed the superior
court's decision that the burden should be on the
attorney-defendant. The court's holding that the attorney-defendant
should plead uncollectibility as an affirmative defense and prove it
by a preponderance of the evidence °m is surprising because of the
number of jurisdictions comprising the majority (at least
seventeen)' 14 compared to the four jurisdictions included in the
minority.
05
It is not, however, as startling when one scrutinizes the court's
justification for its holding. The court considered that the plaintiff
need only prove a loss of judgment on a valid claim and that the
malpractice action may be brought years after the incident that
gave rise to the initial cause of action.0 Indeed, at least one
scholar claims that the trial within a trial, which the plaintiff is
required to conduct, is contrary to common law principles.
0 7
Concededly, a plaintiff bears many burdens in a legal malpractice
case, and the cause of action may be very remote in time from the
original underlying action. Not only might discovery be difficult, but
the whole process can be quite expensive. Sometimes experts, such
as accountants and economists, are needed.1l s One attorney notes
that he and his firm refuse to even consider taking a legal
malpractice case unless the yield of the underlying cause of action
is estimated to be at least $100,000, and at least $500,000 if
substantial doubt exists about the outcome.109
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the plaintiff is
instituting the cause of action and cannot merely claim negligence,
for "(p)roof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do."" 0
Furthermore, the claim for damages cannot be speculative."' The
gravamen of a legal malpractice cause of action is actual loss."'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, "in a
103. Kituskie, 714 A.2d at 1032.
104. See supra note 77, listing thirteen jurisdictions, in addition to the four cited supra
notes 49-76.
105. See cases cited supra notes 80-102.
106. Kituskie, 714 A-2d at 1031.
107. Koffler, supra note 75, at 41. Koffler maintains that such a "trial" is not an
adversarial proceeding between the real parties in interest in the underlying action. Id.
108. Paul D. Rheingold, Legal Malpractice: Plaintiffs Strategies, 15 No. 2 LrIG. 13, 14
(1989).
109. Id.
110. Koffler, supra note 107, at 75 n.61 (quoting P.A. LANDON, POLLOCK's LAW OF ToRs
345 (15th ed. 1951)).




case strikingly similar to this case,""3 ruled that a plaintiffs "actual
injury" is measured by the amount of money she would have
actually collected had her attorney not been negligent,1 4 and
countless other jurisdictions have concurred.
115
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, recognizing the seemingly
overwhelming burden these other jurisdictions have placed on the
plaintiffs, held that the attorney-defendant would bear this burden
in the commonwealth. However, the harshness of requiring the
plaintiff to prove collectibility could have been partially alleviated
in another manner. In Fernandes v. Barrs, the District Court of
Appeal of Florida held that ordinarily, the burden should be on the
plaintiff to prevent him from receiving a windfall by recovering
more from his attorney than he would have from the original
tortfeasor; however, "when the negligence of the attorney makes it
impossible to prove collectibility of the claim, the burden should be
shifted to the attorney to prove that the judgment or any portion
thereof was uncolectible."" 6 The Fernandes decision preserves the
traditional prima facie elements of a legal malpractice cause of
action-duty, causation, and damages-while extending relief to
the plaintiffs when the burden has become nearly impossible to
prove.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have done better. Its
decision in Kituskie not only adopts the minority viewpoint, but it
also allows a plaintiff whose original action may have been
uncollectible to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice
against an attorney without proving actual loss and to possibly
recover a windfall at the attorney's expense. "[A]s the issue is
113. Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 12, Kituskie v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027 (Pa
1998). (No. 0030 E.D. Appeal Dkt. 1997, No. 0031 E.D. Appeal Dkt. 1997).
114. Id. (citing Kiump v. Duffus, 71 F3d 1368, 1374, 1375 (7th Cir. 1995)). See supra
notes 69-76 and accompanying text, which include that court's holding that the burden of
proving collectibility of the underlying judgment is more properly placed on the plaintiff.
115. See supra notes 77 and 49-76.
116. Fernandes v. Bars, 641 So.2d 1371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), disapproved of on
other grounds by Chandris v. Yanakalds, 668 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1995). In Fernandes, the
plaintiffs could have sought recovery through a claims bill to the Florida legislature had it
not been for the attorney's negligence. Id. at 1374. Compare Jerrigan v. Giard, 500 N.E.2d
806, 807 (Mass. 1986) (dictum) (suggesting that an attorney defending a malpractice action
may not rely on the consequences of his own negligence to bar recovery against him).
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whether the client was damaged, it follows syllogistically that the
client was not damaged if he or she would have been unable to




117. Koffier, supmr note 107, at 50.
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